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I. INTRODUCTION
The cooperative system in the Philippines has been character-
ized by stories of successand failure. While the system has been
a recipient of all-out government support, it seems that it has
remained meek and docile.
This paper looks into the reasons for such situation. It examines
the problems and their implications on the cooperative movement
as a whole. It also looks into other rural-based organizations and
their performance. The study also attempts to be as comprehensive
as possible, by way of reviewing the various studies in existence
regarding the subject matter.
A compilation of recommendations and the writer's own views
are likewise included here. The state of things at present indicates
that the cooperative structure in the Philippines deserves a shot
in the arm in some instancesand a blow in others if only to promote
the development of the more deserving cooperatives.
II. MAJOR FINDINGS
A. Studies on the Rural Credit System
1. The Rural and Farm Credit System
The rapid growth of the rural population has put pressure on the
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land-man ratio and has given rise to burgeoning food needs. The
country's development plan hasaddressed this concern and hasarti-
culated the objectives of increased food production, the expansion
and creation of employment opportunities, enhanced rural incomes
and nutritional level, increased agricultural exports, the develop-
ment of agro-based energy sources, and conservation of natural
resou rces.
In trying to achieve theseobjectives, severalrural credit programs
were launched which were meant primarily for the small producers.
These programs cover a host of commodities and activities that
include rice, corn, feedgrains, livestock and poultry, fruits and vege-
tables, cotton, fisheries and cottage industries. They also include
on-farm capital investments and integrated agricultural financing.
Despite these programs, though, there hasnot beenmuch flow of
rural credit into the .countryside. Most of the current credit supply
in the countryside is provided by the private nonformal money-
lenders. This was true in the late 1970s when informal sourcesrose
to prominence as fund suppliers,contributing some 64-78 percent
of all farm credit during the period. The formal sourcesof rural
credit showed their importance only in the mid-19?0s with their
64-6-/ percent contribution as a result of the emergence of the
government's massive supervised credit programs. But this later
petered out due to high loan arrearageswhich compelled financial
institutions to be selective in their lendingto agricultural and rural
business undertakings (TBAC 1980).
Loan biases in agricultural lending are evident among formal
institutions in favor of export and commercial crops. Loans are
mostly short term and concentrated in developed regions.This has
resulted in a "vacuum" among other agricultural prodt_cts and
underdevelopedregions(TBAC 1981).
Aside from these biases, there is a seeming institutional bias
against lending to the rural sector due to risk-return considera-
tions involving uncertainties in physical output as well as in the
market value of the output. The output risks include the weather,
land and man productivity. While the weather risks are essentially
beyond man's control and can be considered as constraints, man
and land productivity could be managed through breakthroughs
in researchand extensionprograms.
Financial institutions could help in intermediating between
groups of farmers and other segmentsof the rural population whoTAN : COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 323
have excessliquidity. The seasonalnature of the farm production
process causes varying supplies and shortages of cash. Through
intermediation, financial institutions could assist in managingthe
cash flow of severaldisjointed operations in the rural areas.The
credit functions of financial institutions are necessary not only
to smooth seasonalliquidity but also to increasethe rate of capital
investmentsin the rural sector.
It is fair to assumethat there might be indivisibilities in the fac-
tor proportions between capital and labor in agriculture. Irrigation
and fertilizers could fall under this category. No amount of extra
man-days could increaseproduction if irrigation and fertilizers are
not provided. Small farmers, however, think otherwise,asevidenced
by the fact that they keep a large householdsize for the purposeof
providing additional labor which the farm may need to increase
productivity,
The rural credit system is a dichotomy between large fund pro-
ducers and small fund producers. Based on this structure, small
producers are only able to get loans from small fund suppliers due
to the former's credit absorptive capacity. Small funders, however,
usually end up with low repayment problems, and their Ioanable
funds are eaten up by operational expenses. Moreover, most small
funders' loan portfolio is concentrated on special borrowergroups,
and when these groups default on their loans, the small funders'
viability and profitability position becomesprecarious(TBAC 1979).
The farm and rural credit system, therefore, has become dys-
functional in carrying out its objectivessuchasthe enhancementof
the transfer of technology through the provision of funds for in-
creased demand for borrowed funds; the facilitation of commod-
ity flows, through the market mechanism,from the producersdown
to the final consumers:and the allocationof funds, throughfinancial
intermediation, to individuals and institutions that could usethese
funds productively. The low volume of credit trickling down to the
rural sectorisreflective of the flows in the rural credit system.
2. Agricultural Credit Policies
The major underlying objectives of the agricultural credit policy
are anchored on the progressiveinstitutionalization of credit and
the allocation of an increasingly larger share for the small farmer324 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
producers and weaker sections of the peasantry. These aims are
reflected in the government's strategy of establishing financial in-
stitutions in the countryside such as rural banks, the Land Bank of
the Philippines, and the like, with the end in view of influencing the
flow of credit to the rural sector, in general, and to the small-scale
producers, in particular.
The agricultural lending policies on small farmer lending programs
can be categorized into: (a) general policies on small farmer lending
programs; (b) Central Bank policies affecting rural bank loans to
small farmers and entrepreneurs; and (c) Central Bank policies on
rediscounting of rural banks' eligible papers.
(a) General Policies
The general policies on small farmer lending programs include:
(1) supervised credit schemes which introduce three important
features, namely, farm plan and budget, Packageof Technology
(POT), and extension services; (2) group lending; (3) guarantee
coverage wherein guarantee feesof 1 percent and 2 percent for short-
term and medium￿long-term loans, respectively, are charged to the
rural banks so as to cover the unsecured portions of loans caused by
nonpayment due to reasons of force ma/eure; (4) accelerated fund
assistancewhich provides for a fund of some t=450 million to enable
rural banks to avail themselves anew of rediscounting privileges;
(5) crop insurance which assuresthe farmer of some funds to finance
his next production expenses if his previous crop is destroyed,
through a 2.0 percent premium payment contribution by the farmer,
1.5 percent by the lending institution, and 7.5 percent by the govern-
ment in case the farmer is the borrower; (6) rediscounting at pre-
ferential rates where the loan value is equivalent to 90 percent of
the outstanding balance on the unpaid portion of eligible instru-
ments at the time of rediscounting for supervised credits, and 80
percent of the outstanding balance for nonsupervised credits; (7)
collateral requirements relaxation in conformity with Presidential
Decree 315 promulgated on 22 October 1973 that asked all finan-
cial institutions participating in agricultural credit programs to
accept a certificate of land transfer (CLT) as a collateral for loan
with a maximum loan value of 60 percent of the value of the farm
holding; (8) marketing arrangements wherein the farmer-borrower
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equivalent to the amount of his loan inclusive of the interest rate
and the marketing agent purchasesthe farmer-borrower's produce
and pays the saidborrower's loan directly to the lendinginstitution
within a specified number of days, and where the lending institu-
tion acceptsthe loan payment made by the marketing agent in be-
half of the borrower andcredits any excessamount to the borrower's
savingsaccount; (9) restructuring of past due loans whereby the
Central Bank may allow the rural banks to restructure their redis-
counting arrearsfor a period of one year if thesearrearsare due to
force majeure and for a maximum period of three years for its
meritorious cases. For their part, rural banks may alsoallow the
restructuring of the farmer-borrower's past due loans for similar
periods for similar reasons;(10) decentralization schemesfor Spe-
cial Time Deposits (STD) availment wherein the Central Bank
empowers the Regional Loan Teams in Central Bank RegionalOffi-
ces and the Department of loans and Credit (D/C) units in the
regionsto accept and processSTD applications and releasethe pro-
ceeds immediately; (11) agricultural credit quota policy which
requiresall banks, either private or public, to allocate 25 percentof
their Ioanable funds for agricultural credit (15 percent for agricul-
ture in general and 10 percent for agrarian reform credit): (12)
integrated approach in agricultural financing whereby the Central
Bank redesignsits lending schemeby simplifying lendingprocedures
to benefit both borrowersand lenders,dovetailing it to the concept
of Integrated Agricultural Financinginitiated by the National Food
and Agriculture Council; and (13) integrated rural financing, which
is a supervisedrural credit program characterized by the adoption
of an area-basedcomprehensivefinancing schemeand area manage-
ment approach, and whose major thrust focuses on the selective
site-specificimplementation approachand on participative area plan-
ning,amongothers.
(b) Central Banh Policies Affecting Rural Banh Loans to .Small
Farmers and Entrepreneurs
Central Bank policies affecting rural bank loans to small farmers
and entrepreneurs touch on the eligibility of borrowers, the purpose
of the loan, loan ceiling, terms of loan, loan releases,interest rates,
servicefeesand other charges,collateral requirement and loan repay-
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On the question of eligibility, the qualifications depend on the
duration of the loan, whether short_, medium-, or long-term, For
short-term loans, the qualified borrowersaresmallfarmers/operators
who own or till lessthan sevenhectaresof viableagricultural land;
agrarian reform beneficiarieswho own no more than three irrigated
and five unirrigated hectares;previous borrowers under any of the
supervisedcredit programswhose experience, background and faci-
lities have been proven aseffective; residents of the locality as cer-
tified by the barangay captain or the municipal government; those
whose repayment rate records warrant eligibility for another project;
vocational students whose parents are willing to co-sign as loan gua-
rantors and whose teachers are amenable to being supervised credit
technicians; municipal fishermen who operate no more than 3-ton
motorized or nonmotorized bancas; and members of agricultural
cooperativeswho arequalified for financing.
For medium- and long-term financing, the qualified borrowers
are (1) farmers who own or till not more than SO hectares; (2)
operators who are engagedor intend to engage in a cottage or agro-
industry with a capital investment not exceedingt=300,000 exclud-
ing land; (3)operators Who are engaged or intend to engage in
transporation enterprises for cargo or mixed cargo and passengers;
(4) persons who are engagedor intend to engagein poultry, swine
or cattle breeding/fattening projects; and (5) persons who are
engaged in the development of fishpond/fishpens or in coastal fish-
ing with a capital investment not exceeding t=300,000 excluding
land.
Short-term loans are usually for (1) the purchaseof seeds,ferti-
lizer, chemicals, work animals, and implements/equipment used in
farm operations or for the hiring of such animals, implements/
equipment, and the purchaseof stocks suchascattle, poultry swine
and fingerlings; (2) farm expensessuch as labor in relation to land
preparation, planting, plant care and harvesting, minor repairs,
construction or improvements in the farm/fishpond/fishpen for
increased productivity purposes; and payments for current taxes/
irrigation fees. For medium- and long-term loans, the loan pur-
poses cover all activities related to agriculture, cottage or agro-
industry whose production cycles are more than one year and which
require the acquisition of machinery/tools/equipment needed in
their undertakings.
Meanwhile, the loan ceiling of the project dependson the type ofTAN: COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 327
the project and on the implementing guidelines of the credit pro-
gPam,as well as on the viability and actual needs of the project,
the borrower's creditwothiness and repayment capacity, and the
collateralsoffered.
Regarding loan terms, for short-term loans, the loan maturity
does not exceed 360 days while for medium- and long-term loans,
the maturity period varies in accordancewith the economic life of
the project and the projected cashflows. However, in each case,it
should not exceed the specified maturity period stipulated in the
implementingguidelines.
Loan proceeds under the ordinary lending schemeare released
to the borrower in full. The loan amount under the supervisedcredit
program is deposited in the special savingsdeposit account of the
borrower. Amounts are then released by the depository bank in
accordancewith the farm plan a_d budget. This usually holds for
short-term loans. For medium- and long-term loans, the loan
amounts releaseddepend onthe project plan.
On the matter of interest rate, for short-term loans,it dependson
the prevailinginterest rate asdetermined by market forces. For ordi-
nary loans with a maturity period of 730 days or less,the interest
rate is placed as 16 percent per annum if secured,and 18 percent
per annum if unsecured.For loans which mature in more than 730
days, the interest rate is 21 percent per annum, excluding commis-
sionsand other charges.
Service fees and other chargesdepend on the discretion of the
lending institution. Up to 2 percent per annum may be assessed by
the borrower on the loan pr'ncipal or outstanding balance,which-
ever is lower, under the ordinary loansand 3 percent on the loan
balance of CB-IBRD loans. Nevertheless,for a loan not exceeding
_=2,000, a T=20.00 servicecharge iscollected. For Agrarian Reform
beneficiaries borrowers, the minimum charge shall not exceed 2
percentor t=150.00 per annum,whichever islower.
Initially, no collateral is required for short-term loansunder the
supervisedcredit programs. Recently, however, lending institutions
were allowed to impose a collateral requirement in the form of
unencumbered real/personal property, chattel mortgage on stand-
ing crops or object of financing, pledge of bonded warehouse
receipts, acceptable co-makers and joint liability or guarantee
coverage.
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collateral may assume the form of first mortgage on titled and
untitled immovable property and bonds securities. However, loans
of agrarian reform beneficiaries and small fishing boat operators may
be secured with a guarantee by the "Agricultural Guarantee Fund"
to the extent that their loansare not secured.
Repayment of short-term loans usually is made at a time when
the borrower has the highest income or when the principal income
of the borrower is available. Payment of loans may be in cash or in
kind as in the caseof Masagana99 loans.
For medium- and long-term loans, repayment is scheduled in
equal installments inclusive of principal and interest On an annual,
semiannual or shorter-period basis except in caseswhere deferred
payments have beengranted by the lending institutions.
(c) Central Bank Policies on Rediscounting of Rural Banks Eligi-
ble Papers
Central Bank policies on the rediscounting of rural banks' eligible
papers involve at least three major aspects, namely: credit ceiling,
arrearagesratio, and risk-asset ratio.
The ceiling for rediscounting is set at 500 percent of net worth
and 300 percent of monthly averagesavings-cum-time deposit lia-
bilities during the four months immediately preceding the date of
loan application. Rural Banks (RBs) may avail themselves of redis-
counts from the Central Bank for any number of years during the
year subject, however, to the RBs' operating capital.
The arrearagesratio, meanwhile, which enables the rural banks to
rediscount with the Central Bank and to participate in special finan-
ing programs is set at 25 percent. Exceptions, however, apply to
certain special credit programs, provided that the financial assist-
ance granted by the Central Bank is to be utilized solely for the par-
ticular program for which such assistance is provided. If the redis-
counting appears were incurred due to natural calamities, the rural
banks may submit to the Central Bank a capital buildup program and
conversion scheme.
For banks to be able to rediscount with the Central Bank and to
participate in special financing programs, the ratio of capital
accounts to their total risk assets should not be less th_n ]0 per-
cent.
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Despite the positive salientfeaturesof the supervisedcredit schemes,
•the beneficiaries appear not to have improved their economic lot.
This may be due to the many risks in agriculture brought about by
the vagariesof weather, uncertain packageof technolo_ and inade-
quate price support. The situation has created another unlikely
situation where the loan absorptivecapacity of borrowers islow and
arrears are high, compounded further by the seemingly acceptable
loan default syndrome and poor collection mechanismon the part of
lendinginstitutions.
Group lendings through such groups as the seldas or damayans
have been failures. The lack of discipline among membersand the
"to each his own" attitude has substantially eroded the groups'
confidencein eachother.
To protect the interest rate spreadfrom beingeaten up under the
supervisedcredit program, the Agricultural Guarantee Fund (AGF)
wasput up, but so far, statisticsrevealthat it has not lived up to its
roledue to factors beyondthe Fund'sliability.
Meanwhile, Presidential Decree No. 717 expresslyprovides prior-
ity to agrarian reform beneficiaries. While financial institutionshave
overcomplied with the 25 percent of Ioanable funds, compliance
with the agrarian reform credit subquota through direct lending has
been minimal. Despite general overcompliance, the decree has had
a negligibleeffect on banks' investment portfolio as evidenced by
very slight positive, if not negative,changesin the ratios of agricul-
tural loansto total loansoutstanding aswell asof agriculturalloans
to net Ioanable funds outstanding after the decree took effect. Nor
did compliance have any significant impact on bank profitability
levels becausethe conditions for the effective implementation of
the decreeare not, in the first place,adequatelypresent. First, there
are no Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) to provide loans to
in particular areas. Second, many financial institutions are urban-
based and are not oriented towards lending to the rural sector or
to the ARBs, for that matter. Third, there is a lack of identified
viable projects for potential borrowers.Fourth, financial institutions
rarely find supportand encouragementto lend directly to loan bene-
ficiaries due to the presence of alternative compliance vehicles
through the purchase of Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness
(CBCI). Fifth, other bond instruments and government protection
measuresand incentivesare inadequate. Sixth, there isa lack of veri-
fication of compliance at the field level. And finally, sanctionsfor330 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
noncompliance are rarely carried out.
Central bank's policies affecting rural banks' loan to small farms
and the policiesaffecting the rediscounting of eligible papersof the
rural banks are stringent and some are alsounrealistic. For instance,
the fundability of loans once these are in the hands of the rural
banks poses one big problem of verification, rendering the pur-
pose for the loan academic. Many rural banks have been found
guilty of diversion of funds while their investment activities in allied
servicesare largely constricted or limited.
3. Review of Institutions/Lenders
At the forefront of the rural and agricultural credit system which
provides loans to small producers and entrepreneurs are the rural
banks. But they, too, haveto contend with severalproblems.
Under the Masagana 99 program alone, it is estimated that the
critical repayment level, below which profits would assumea nega-
tive figure, is 98.?- percent. For rural banks, an averagerepayment
rate of 98.2 percent is a tall order, considering that agricultural
lending is a.Costly proposition.
The rural banking, system is also confronted with the following:
(1) most rural banks operate on an uneconomic size: (2) their
•. growth in resources is impressive at first glance, but a closer look
at the growth structure reveals that resource accretions are due to
the addition of new rural banks rather than to internally gene-
rated resources; (3) rural banks can hardly mobilize savings. The
bulk of their resources come from government equity counter-
part and borrowings from the government; (4) delinquent accounts
and poor loan and investment quality portfolios havesubstantially
eroded the system's profitability and viability; (5) mismanagement,
inadequate personnel capability and poor salary structure have also
contributed to the rural banks' unprofitable state: (6) Central Bank's
paternalistic approach by pampering and overprotection also did
much to make the rural banks too dependent on the CB;.and (7)
engaging in too many supervised credit programs has resulted in
overexposure, poor quality portfolio and, thus, poor repayment.
Government banks such asthe Land Bank of the Philippines, the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Bank lend to small farmers only intermittently. The bulk of their
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traders andcommercial loans.
Private commercial banks and other types of banks lend either
on a commercial basisor to large borrowers, nonfarmers and big
producers.
Several bottlenecks plague rural and agricultural lenders, among
which are the following: (a) the high specialization of banks leads
to a dearth of medium- and long-term funds for agriculture, and to
compartmentalized servicesand segmentation of the agricultural
clientele. The latter segments,among others, big and small peasant-
farmers, agrarianreform farmers and sugarfarmers, and bigand small
traders: (b) bank government funding agenciescannot sustain the
noncredit needs of the lessprivileged sector of the borrower-spec-
trum. Nonbank government financing agencieswhich form part of
the rural financial system include the Farm Systems Development
Corporation (FSDC), Philippine Tobacco Association (PTA), Minis-
try of Agrarian Reform (MAR), and Cooperative Development Loan
Fund (CDLF). The CDLF lends directly to small marginal farmers,
resettlers,landlessrural workers and agricultural cooperatives. How-
ever, it only providesa negligibleshare(lessthan one-half of a per-
cent) of total loans, with most of thesegovernment fundinginstitu-
tions depending on government sourcesand funds which are most-
ly treated as dole-outs; (c) Apparently, there is no coordination
among financial institutionsat the grassrootslevel,resultingin multi-
ple financing for the same borrower; (c) sinceseveralfinancing insti-
tutions are persuadedto lend to the rural and agriculturalsectors,
there exists no link among them to promote loan syndication for
reasonsof lack of identified bankable projectsand the absenceof a
lead bank for loan consortium purposes;(e) informal lenderswho
charge high interest rates also lend loansto small producersto the
latter's disadvantage. Most of these lenders, who are also traders,
own adequate facilities to service the marketing needsof the small
producersat depressedprices. Some government marketing outfits
such as the National Food Authority (NFA) and the Agricultural
Marketing Cooperatives (AMCs) absorb the marketing needsof the
small farmer producers, but the former absorbsonly up to 15 per-
cent of the market while the latter aresaddledwith severalproblems,
suchasthe lack of capital.
Recently, informal lenders also becameselectivein their loaning
operations. They havefollowed the lendingstrategy of institutional
lending institutions, ruling out the possibility of loaningto marginal
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and submarginalproducers.
4. Review of Borrowers
Most farmers and food producers are small, and most (61 percent)
farm holdings are less than three hectares. Due to the smallness of
farmers and to high production risks and insufficient marketing sup-
port, farmers are faced with cash flow problems as income competes
with funds for production and household upkeep purposes.
Several studies support the notion that rural credit borrowers are
hardly bankable and hardly get loans. Tan (1978), for instance,
analyzed the cash flow balances of a typical agrarian reform benefi-
ciary under various assumptions of land size, family size, household
expenditures, type of labor utilization, sources and amount of
loans, etc.
Permutations of sot_rce of loans and type of labor used in the farm
were combined with the usual socioeconomic conditions and frame-
work of operations of an ordinary rice farmer to create six models.
to determine his cash flow position at the end of each month and
year. One-year cash flows were simulated from these models and the
monthly and year-end cash balances were noted. The effect of varia-
tions in factors such as land size, loan size and effect of typhoon
damage were analyzed through sensitivity analysis. Simulation
results revealed that, in almost all cases, months with negative cash
balances outnumber months with positive cash flow balances and
that the various assumptions and conditions under which a farmer
can have a positive year-end balance seem rare and infeasible. A far-
mer owning one hectare of irrigated land should have no loans other
than _=1,200 from a formal source per cropping season and should
not utilize labor outside the family while following the Masagana
99 recommended package of technology. One who uses labor both
from within and outside the family and has the same credit positions
as above should own at least 1.25 hectares of irrigated land to be
able to have a positive cash balance. One who avails himself of loans
from informal sources should have bigger landholdings to end up
with favorable cash balances. Such findings reveal that, despite the
success of government agricultural credit programs in increasing
food production, they had little beneficial effects on the socioeco-
nomic status of the producers.
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workers in three selected barangay was aimed at documenting their
socioeconomic profile. It determined the basic needs and credit
requirements of this particular group and gave insignts into this
group's perception of credit, banks, the government and their con-
dition.
The study, which covered the barangays of Abangay, lloilo,
Bahaypare, Pampanga, and Tinawagan, CamarinesSur, found that
the rural workers are a very disadvantagedgroup in the agricultural
sector. The group isvery impoverished,with income levelsthat are
low and seasonal.The group's major activities are mainly personal
services, making these landlessrural workers uncompetitive in the
highly competitive agricultural labor market. Interview results
revealed that the government showed lessattention by not creating
problems addressed to their problem. In fact, the agrarian reform
programhashada negativeeffect on them (TBAC 1978).
In a surveymadeby the TBAC in 1982, field resultsindicatedthat
about a third borrowed during the survey year. Paddy irrigatedfar-
mers, large farm operators, and agrarian reform beneficiarieshad
a relatively high level of indebtedness.Informal sources, mostly
palay traders, accountedfor close to two-thirds of the total number
of loans while formal sourcesdominated the lending arena in terms
of lending,with about three.fifths of total loanvolume.
A finding of the study that one out of ten farmers was a formal
borrower and three out of ten farmers borrowed from either the
formal or informal sourcesisa clear indicationthat the flow of cred-
it to the agricultural sector is assumingminiscule proportions in
relation to the requiredrural credit needs.
The study concludedthat the main bottlenecks in rural credit are
the bankability of small farmers/producers, the secondary role of
credit in improving farm productivity and income,and the limited
accessof farmersto formal credit.
TBAC (1981), using a sample of 34 farmer respondents(lease-
holders, full amortizing owners and CLT holding tenurial classes)
in Nueva Ecija in 1981 observed that, without the use of loans,
almost all sample respondentswould have had deficit runs from
the planting to the maturing phaseof the crop. Without loans,there
would be a probabledecline in harvestand farm income becauseof
the lack of proper inputs, the reduction in the scaleof operations,
and the lack of financial resources.Other resultswere an improve-
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an improvement through multiple cropping of the incomeflow and
repayment capacity of farmers, and the inability of sample farmers
to settle their total current and carryover obligations.
Other reasons why small producers were not able to pay their
loans were the inadequate loan amounts, the lack of discipline, and
the lack of aconsciouseffort_to saveto finance farm activities.
Farmers who obtained loans in proportion to their farm size or
whose loans were the actual amounts ailowed did not fare well
because the amounts were not the funds needed or required. In
other instances, many farmers had borrowed funds in excess of
what they needed or required, letting them accumulate some "sav-
ings" which they spent elsewhere. In the meantime, they had some
hard time repaying their loan (Castillo 1982). This reinforces the
general impression that credit ceilings are not based on required
needs of the borrowers, stymying the opportunities of the produ-
cers to attain maximum productivity. Meanwhile, farmers who
overborrow do not religiously apply the recommended package of
technology due to inadequate extension and verification services.
The averagepropensity to save has been found to be a low 7 per-
cent among sample respondents in Iloilo, Nueva Ecija and Davao del
Sur (IbaSez 1978). The marginal propensity to save which is higher
at 13 percent implies that increasing incomes will result in further
increases in the average proportion of income saved. About 80
percent of asset accumulation is in the form of capital formation,
livestock and poultry and farm implements. Assets held in financial
instruments constitute a negligible 3 percent. The primary determi-
nant of savings is income, with the latter influenced by size of cul-
tivated land area, level of liquid assets,land ownership and average
education. Rural householdsappear to be generally responsiveto
the opportunity cost of high consumption levels.Most of the rural
householdssurveyed were not aware of the functions of financial
institutions. The general perception was that banks were acting as
conduits for leading and not for savings.For forced savingspro-
grams, however, the BSF and BGF have been growing at relatively
high rates. Nevertheless, voluntary savingshave rarely set in the
rural areasexcept among school children through the "school sav-
ings campaign program." Perhapsthe lack of savingsconsciousness
among rural householdsmay be ascribed to the lack of incentives
to save and to the absenceof a vigorous campaign to tap rural
savings capacity.TAN. COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
5. Summary of Recommendations
1. A recommendation for the institutional credit delivery system
and lending institutions is to continue the presentmultiagency
approach to rural financing and also to adopt an effective
information exchange.network among such institutions at the
field levelto eliminate overlapping of lendingservices.This was
done during the launching of the Kilusang Kabuhayan sa
Kaunlaran (KKK) programwherein past-duetswere not allowed
to borrow from the KKK-designated banks. Another recom-
mendation is for them to continue functioning asconduitsfor
real financial intermediation and to allowa viable loan program
along with a socialloan program.The latter canbe addressed to
the nonbank government entities especially since they are
capable of reaching marginal farmers and other nonbankable
rural projects.To abatelendingoperation inefficiencies,training
programs,upgradingof personneland a regularmonitoring and
evaluation of these socialloan programsshould be conducted.
The rural banking system should also encouragemergersand
consolidation on a provincewide or regionwide basisto make
the new groupings more competitive and efficient, and to
improve their economic size stature. The provincial or regional
rural bank may rediscountwith the CB, thus eliminating the
retail nature of individual rural bank rediscounting.As soon as
the systemmatures, it can subsequentlychangeinto a national
bank. For cooperative rural banks, mergeror consolidation is
also suggested. The consolidated CRB should assume the
postureof a purely private commercial bank with existingCRBs
as brancheswith expanded servicenetworks in the rural areas.
Land Bank could buy into the equity sharesof the rural banks
and make thesebanks its own branches.
Many rural banks have in fact consolidated,such asthe 14
rural banks in Bohol, equitizin_gmany CRBs and RBs at :F1
million each. Another suggestionin formulating an effective
institutional credit delivery system is by upgradingthe criteria
for the openingof new rural banks, putting more emphasison
capital requirements by way of raisingthe minimum capital to_
_i million, developingbank managementexpertise,and check-
ing the potential of the area where the rural bank isto be Ioca.
ted. Another option is to encouragethe putting up of bra_.ches3_ JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
in the rural areasfor every two branchesopened in urban areas
by stronger banks such as the large commercial banks. Incen-
tives should be provided, and theseinclude a reduction in the
5 percent grossmargin tax, a reduction in the tax on interest
income of depositorsservicedby the branch, or tax exemption
on the operations of the particular branch during the first
three to five years of existence. Since rural informal lenders
have been found to be more efficient and to have developed
a strong Clientele basein the countryside, they may be insti-
tutionalized, subjectto certain conditions.
2. A retention of the quota policy is suggestedto lessen the
ineffectivenessof the agricultural credit quota policy and the
unresponsiveness of hanks to the weaker section of the pea-
antry. However, it should be modified to make it more effec-
• tire, so that the small farmer will not find himselfat the losing
end due to high risk and the highcost of lendingto him. The
quota policy could cushion this fear; there is thus a necessity
for the moral suasioneffects of the quota system. Sufficient
guaranteessuch as a 50 percent all-risk guaranteemay alsobe
enforced to attract high-riskloans.
3. For agricultural credit programsto proliferate an integrated
and development approach to agricultural financing is recom-
mended. The experiencegainedin commodity-specific program
formulation and implementation shouldserveasbuilding•blocks
for integratedarea development planning. The integrated Rural
Financing (IRF), which is an ongoingproject that features the
operationalization of the area management interagency
approach and area-specific, comprehensivearea development,
and many activity financing schemes, could be considered.
So far, a total of twelve development siteshavebeenidentified
in 1984.
4. Activities addressing client-related problems such as small-
scale farmers' cash flow problems, unavailability and bank-
ability, improvement of small-scale farming system, farm
technology, infrastructure, and marketsand favorable pricesfor
farmers' produce to increase•their absorptivecapacityfor cre-
dit and repayment capability; accessto or provision of otherTAN : COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 337
employment opportunities either within or outside agriculture
such as rural home industriesand other home-basedundertak-
ings to buoy up the farm households' income levels,enhance
repayment capability, and subsequentlyreducerisksof lending
to small-scale farmers; and the provision of skills training,
better accessto educationalfacilitiesfor the children of farmers
especiallythose who till at the margin, it isalso.suggested that,
in relation to the farmers' capacity to pay, the farms and far-
mars should be categorizedand differentiated accordingto pro-
ductivity size, location, availability of irrigation, term status
including sharingarrangementor leaserental, capital and labor
resource availability, credit utilization, family size, accessto
favorablemarket price, etc.
5. Some recommendationsfor the lessprivilegedgroups such as
the agrarianreform beneficiariesare: (1) intensify and speedup
land transfer operations under the agrarian reform program in
order to strengthenthe financial makeupof the farm leasehold;
(2) promote growth in farm leaseholdequity and furnish the
small farmers with an endowment level from which long-term
farm development may proceed; (3) encourage the adoption
of multi-cropping activities to providesmall farmers with addi-
tional sourcesof incomeand improve their cashflow structure;
(4) evaluatethe debt burdenand financial capacity of potential
farmer-borrowers rather than basingcredit lending decisions
on the cost of the packageof technology or the financial need
of the farmer to enable him to diversify his farm and non-
farm undertakings; and (5) introduce farmer self-help pro-
gramsor village.levelmutual benefit schemesfor small farmer
credit programs.There is a need to expand the credit delivery
system by expandingthe existinginstitutional network.
B. Cooperative Performance
Samahang Nayons
Studies on the performance and problems of SamahangNayons
abound in Philippine literature. Foremost of these is the study by
Castillo (1982) which elicited the following commentsfrom farmers,
implementors,programparticipantsand others onthe SN's features::338 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Comments
SN Features Positive Negative
1. Generalprospects SN isof greatsocio- SN isnot likely to suc-
economicbenefit to ceeddueto people'sbad




not arriving in time;








2. Success of SN Success of SN canonly Sameasabove
in locality beachievedif members
andofficersshowin-
terestin theirSN.
3. BGF BGF isgoodandbeing BGF isdifficult to imple-
implementedbecause it ment becausemembers
• wouldbebeneficialto cannotafford it; there is
SN membersespecially; no immediatebenefit;
it is in accordance with pastbadexperiences;
therulesof the Board poor harvest;wait-and-
of Directors;andit is see, attitude of farmers;
accep_d by both mere- andmembersaresmall
bersandnon-members, landowners.
4. BSF BSF isbeingimple- BSF isdifficult to imple-
mented and accepted ment becauseit is too
becauseit would be burdensome;there isno
beneficial to members; cooperation among mem-
it will be usedin forming bersandofficers; it is
AMC/CRB or for emer- difficult to understand;
gency;it teachessaving; there is lack of supervi-
and it is refundable, sion; it isnot enforcedTAN:COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 339
Comments






5. Disciplinary Disciplinarymeasures Disciplinary measures
mustbe imposedon shouldnot be implemen-
erringmembersto ensure ted because they are




6. SNaschannel It makespossible lower SNdoesnot functionas
of farm pricesfor farm-inputsand a channelfor farm inputs
inputsand higherpricesfor farmpro, and productsbecause
products ducts,andmiddlemen technicians areagainst
will beeliminated, suchpractice;besides, it
isimpractical.
7. SN aschannelof SN isameasurefor No governmentservices
government gettingtechnicaland were channeledthrough
services financialassistance from theSNbecauseit isnot
thegovernmentand functional: it would be
privateagencies and in conflict with the rune-
facilitiesoutreachof tionsof thebarrio coun-
governmentprograms cil: other government




8. SN asinstrument SN complements SN, asafacilitating
of land agrarianreform,bring- instrumentof land
reform ingabouttechnical reform, isnot appli-
changes andmakingfar- cable.because many
mersownersof the land SN areasarenot
they till. coveredby land reform.340 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Actual conduct was abbreviated and only more than a half of SNs
completed their training courses. Agrarian reform message was
better absorbedthan SN principles, and concept learning was not
actually translated into actual behavior. In the area of capital build-
up, despitesome level of compliance with the savingprogram, prac-
tically 90 percent of SNsregardedBSF and BGF collection asa prob-
lem. Despitethe trend in capital mobilization, SN is the only pro-
gram which has succeeded in generating funds from farmers. For
t_20 per annum, with almost a million members,it had been possi-
ble to raise nearly t=100 million in five years. Among the other
SN features, discipline was the least implemented, followed by
learning and saving.
Assessing the SNs in general, 40 percent of SN membersbelieved
that the SN movement was a success,11 percent thought it afailiJre
while almost half were unsure. For thosewho saidthat the SN move-
ment was a success,about one-third reasoned that the external
input from the government such asthe efficiency of the Municipal
Development Officer (MDO), Bureau of Cooperative Development
(BCOD) workers and the technician and the inspiring government
attention and incentives for rural development contributed much
to the movement's success. About 70 percentattributed the success
to themselves, to the wholehearted cooperation of members, and
to the efficiency of officers and their honesty and integrity. About
82 percent of the respondentsblamed the failure on the unwilling-
ness and low capacity of members to settle their financial obliga-
tions, on nonattendance in meetings, and on the inefficiency and
dishonesty of SN officers. In general, an assessmentby local offi-
cials and field workers showed that only a little over one-half of
them were definitely positive about the SN project's successin the
localities.
One successfulcooperative is the Quinlogan Samahang Nayon.
According to a study mad_ by the Special Task Force Division,
Bureau of Cooperative Development of the Ministry of Local Go-
vernment and Community Development, the successof the group
(composed of 94 farmers) was due to the active role played by
the leaders of the SN; the participation of the members in every
stageof program planning and implementation; the self-reliant spirit
of the group members;and the timely extensionassistance provided
by the government. The latter factor hasbeenrecognizedasan indis-
pensable component of a development program and a dominatingTAN: COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 341
factor in the successfuloperations of some SamahangNayons (Spe-
cial Task Force Division, 1978).
Development Specialists international, Inc. (1981)found that
the majority (72 percent) of the M-99 SN-farmers consideredthe
technicians indispensableto the program. More than 80 percent of
M-99 and non M-99 farmers believed in the techniciansbecauseof
their credibility in providing advice on the choice of input and
farming techniques. Moreover, about 60 percent thought that far-
mers should get production loansonly when there is a technician
to supervisethe useof the loan.
The presenceof live-in technicians alsocontributed to the success
of the MalatgaoSamahan Nayon of Malatgao,Narra. Palawan.It was
noted that one of its successfactors was the development of the
cooperative spirit among the farmers (Qui_ones Jr. and Acasio
1981). In consultation with the live.in technician, farmers agreed
on What crop to raise in a givenseason, set the scheduleof farm
activities from land preparation to harvesting, and implemented
their common plan through group farming. Production on the 75-
hectare farm wasquite impressive.Ricestalksgrewat a uniform rate,
pests were effectively controlled, water was efficiently managed,
fertilizer application was uniform and harvests were bountiful.
Becauseof this, this was the only SN among the sevenSNsthat was
able to fully repay its loan for production inputs of t=6,630.00
which it got from the Palawan National Agricultural College Per-
sonnel Cooperative Credit Union, Inc. (PNACPCCUI) while the
other six which got loans from the same source had total arrears
of overt=60,000.0U.
Perhapsit is assumedthat successfulSNs utilize or need a com-
bination of inputs: credit, extension, participation by members in
any aspectof SN activity, and a self-reliantspirit.
The Agricultural Marketing Cooperative (AMCs). The AMCs
serve as the marketing arm of the SamahangNayons but have not
sufficiently participated in marketing activities to sustainthe mar.
keting needsof their SN constituents. The reasonsfrequently cited
include the lack of capital, inadequate discipline and training, the
lack of patronageby SNs,stiff competition posed by private traders,
and the lack of competent personnel.Cegarial (1978), who studied
extensively the performance of AMCs, asserted that the level of
performance of AMCs dependedon five (5) major factors: (a) Ioc_
tion wherein most AMCs were located along or near the main high-342 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
way and away from commercialcenters. While location isconsidered
strategic, AMCs are not ableto put up outlets to service members in
far-away places due to business uncertainty and lack of capital; (b)
total amount of capital, in which the lack of capital could mean the
small contribution of members and lack of responsibility of the mem-
bers in paying their loans and for the goods tl_ey acquired from the
AMC on credit. Capital inadequacy could force the AMCs to special-
ize in the sale of inputs, thus neglecting the marketing of the mem-
bers' produce. Fund insufficiency could also force the AMCs to bor-
•row at usually high interest rates; (c) profitability of the business,
wherein nonprofitability could mean the offering of AMCs at a
price sale of farm inputs lower than that of their competitors. This
situation is further aggravated by high administrative expense; (d)
members' participation, in which nonparticipation of some AMC
members is due to stringent operating policies of the AMCs and the
lack of coordination of the different agricultural programs. AMC's
lack of capital could be a result of the small membership contribu-
tions; (e) qualification of the manager and members of the Board
of Directors. Some 10 percent of the membership of the Board of
Director's had not finished intermediate• education. Considering the
duties and responsibilities they are supposed to perform, their edu-
cation did not give them a stamp of managerial competence and
ability.
A study of 15 AMCs and eight CRBs in 1980 revealed that five
problems beset the AMCs despite their Iocational advantages,their
promising arrangement profile and conventional businesspractices
and procedures (ACCI 1980). These problems were the lack of
operating capital, inadequate discipline and education among farmer-
members, the generally weak support of 5N members, inadequate
training and processingfacilities, and the lack of extension personnel.
The Cooperative Rural Banhs (CRBs). The CRBs are the lending
arm of the SNs and the AMCs. Like•the AMCs, however, the CRBs
find themselves in difficult financial straits. According to TBAC
(1981), the uncertainty of the CRBs is brought on by their charac-
teristics as follows: (a) small resourcesand uneconomic size of ope-
rations; (b) paid-up capital, which comprises only about 20 per-
cent of authorized capital and half of the CRBs, is still without coun-
terpart equity from the government; (c) high borrowing costs•consti-
tuting 64 percent of total resources;(d) generally profitable opera-TAN: COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 343
tions, wherein return on evenuesis negative at 2 percent, rendering
eight of 28 in a precarious liquidity situation: (a) only 40 percent of
CRBs generated a net income during the period 1978-80 and almost
all incurred excessive expenses; (f).a half of the CRBs had past
due ratios exceeding 25 percent, and the systemwide collection rate
was a low 57 percent; (g). insufficient loanable resources such as
deposits, capital and borrowings; (h) inability to effectively compete:
(i) high incidence of mismanagement problems and conflicts, and
lack of professionalism in managing most CRBs; and (j) lack of
•strong cooperative base and institutional linkages, lukewarm atti-
tude of SN members in patronizing CRBs, and improper concept of
role asowners and asborrowers.
Problems centered on the inadequate number of staff, the inade-
quate loanable funds due to generally weak investment support given
to member-SNs; increasing past-due loans dueto difficulty in obtain-
ing a closer coordination with full support from SNs and AMCs in
effecting a systematized collection scheme, and the dole-out mental-
ity of 5N members-borrowers; and the lack of farmers' general
knowledge or negative attitude towards normal loaning policies and
procedures of the bank so much so that these farmers resist normal
procedures of submitting basic documents, question the CRB's
system of appraising collaterals, and get impatient when loan releases
are delayed.
Other Types of Cooperatives. Mixed trends characterize the per-
formance of the other farmer-based or rural-based cooperatives.
Some have miserably failed while others succeeded.
Among the cooperatives that failed is the moshav-type General
Ricarte Agricultural Cooperative, Inc. (GRACI)in Nueva Ecija.
Started in 1975 with the technical assistance of Israeli consultants
and massivegovernment management and credit support, it focused
on rice and poultry production. It fared well in its first few years
but began to taper off a few years later. Failure could beattributed
to the following factors; (a) the Ricarte farmers were not able to
respond well to the sudden inflow of wealth. With savingsawareness
unknown to them, household appliances and unnecessaryitems were
bought during their buying sprees,(b) with the initial successof the
poultry business, the farmers poured their resources into this activity
at the expense of their crops. As a result, when the poultry business
failed due to poor quality of feeds, diseaseand poor marketing, the344 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
farmers had no way of bailingthemselvesout; (c) the government,in
its effort to aid the farrners, unwittingly introduced to them the
"dole-out" mentality; (d) due to the multiplicity of agenciesin the
area, the source of the problem could not be pinpointed; (e) funds
were reportedly diverted to other purposes by the cooperative's
officers, leadingto a complete lack of interest on the farmers'side;
(f) the technology brought by the Israeliswas not completely ab-
sorbed by the farmers such that, when the former left, most of the
projects had to be abandoned;(g) there wasa basicconflict between
the BarangayCouncil and the cooperativeofficers, resulting in mu-
tual distrust; and (h) there was no binding force among members
such that the cooperatives were organized only during good times
and by-passedduring bad timeswithin the cooperativecycle.
Montemayor studied the KalasungayFree Farmers' Cooperative,
Inc., located in Malaybalay Bukidnon. It is a credit cooperative
which later on branched into other activities by establishinga con-
sumer cooperative store and a marketing section to service the
input and output marketing needs of its members. It was founded
as a small credit union of 16 membersin 1969 but after three years
becamea registeredcooperativewith t=13,800 in fixed savingsdepo-
sitsto start with and 75 membersin itsfold. It wasduringthe period
1973-82 that the cooperativegrew at aconsiderablepacein termsof
its volume of loans granted and repayment and marketing and
cooperative storesales.
In early 1983, however, the cooperative slowly failed. Member
contributions dwindled to low levels, marketing and store sales
volume dipped substantially and the repayment rate was a measly
49 percent. Montemayor attributed the failure to the following rea-
sons: Fund mismanagement. When two of the top cooperativeoffi-
cers were sent to Manila to conduct training on financial and busi-
ness management, they failed to formally relegate their functions
to appropriate persons. During their absence, there was rampant
fund misuse by those at the helm of operations. Although the two
eventually turned the operationsaround on their return, the damage
had been done and could not be rectified in a short period of time;
Shrinking land size. As early as 1980, a largecoffee-basedfood com-
pany started leasingthe landsof farmer-members. By 1982, almost
60 percentof farmer-members'total landholdingsalready were in the
hands of the food firm, leaving the farmers with no more than a
homelot to plant something on. With no more landsto till, therewasTAN: COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
no steady source of income to rely on; Fundissue. Farmers are
entitled to a large sum of money payable every five years as pay-
ment for the leaseof their landsby the food company. The farmers,
however, lured by the illusion of money, begana wanton spending
spree upon receiPt of the first payment in 1980 with the hope that
•their jobs as casualworkers in the coffee company would tide them
over. It was too late becauseafter they had spent their leasepro-
ceeds,they suddenly felt that their wagesfrom the food outfit were
barely enoughfor them. In the meantime, nothing wasaddedto their
contributions. In fact, they becamenet borrowers;Thin distribution
of time and efforts by cooperative officers. During the 1981 ba-
rangay elections, many .of the cooperative officers ran and won as
barangay captains and councilmen or Kagawad.This, however,was
ultimately inimical to the cooperative as the officers becamebusy
with their new posts and neglected the cooperatives;Drought.
The protracted eight-month brought from October 1.982 to May
1983 exacted a heavy toll on the farmers' produce. There was no
corn harvestedand abacawilted away, thus leavingthe farmerswith
no other recoursebut to borrow from the union which by then was
itself runningout of funds.
Other cooperativesthat failed were the farmer-basedcooperatives
in the towns of Narra and Aborlan, Palawan.TBAC (1981) conduc-
ted severalcasestudiesof someof thesecooperativesin two towns in
1981.
The Car-Gum Credit Cooperative was set up in 1969 starting with
three membersonly. In early 1975, its members grew to 1972, and
they believed that they were about to scale greater heights. The
union expanded its businessby enagagingin the sari-saristore busi-
nesswith wares provided by the PNAC Cooperative Store, and by
acquiringa solar and mechanicaldrier,a warehouse,a rice mill anda
thresher. Suddenly in mid-1975, the cooperative's membership
thinned out and lanquishedin painful failure. It all startedwith one
deal involving at=15,000 loan from the PalawanNational Agricultu-
ral College (PNAC) for the purchaseof farm inputs. A similar deal
for _=11,000 was hatchedearlier in 1974 but wasfully paid in early
1975; hence the second loaning line. The full amount oft=15,000
was used for fertilizers, and the transaction was proper except that
the fertilizers were fake. This wasa self-destructingendeavorasfarm
crops began to wilt, feeling the catastrophic impact of the bogus
fertilizers. Because of these, the farmer-members lost interest in346 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
their cooperative and the latter wasneverthe sameagain.
The Narra Proper CooperatiVe Credit Union (NPCCU) seems to
be an adjunct failure of the Car-Gum Credit Cooperative. Established
in 1972, it operated briefly before it disintegrated ih 1975. Since
then, membershipmeetihgs becamescarceand far between until, in
1980, the union was nothin_ more than a skeleton haunted by an
outstanding debt of over]=15,000 in favor of PNAC from an origi-
nal loan of ]=12,880 in 1972. The cooperative union failed to re-
register in 1975, for reasonsof lack of interest among its members
and lossof confidence in the leadership,arising from the dissipa-
tion of funds without thorough explanation. Some of the reasons
why this cooperative failed were: (1)dishonesty of incorporators
and board membersJofflcers. The monthly, amortizations or contri-
butionsof memberswere channeledto personaluseby incorporators
and union officers; (2) lack of cooperative training among coope-
rative members. Most farmer-members had not kept tabs on their
role _.scooperative members either becausethey were ill-trained,
lacked trainors or were simply indifferent. Farmers join to.get a
chance to make a loan; (3) inadequate loan capacity and funds
mismanagement; lneffectivit_.y of extension. Extension workers were
not full-time workers since most of them had business concerns of
their own. (4) overselling of the cooperative movement. Champions
of PNAC-motivated cooperative movements allegedly promised a
lot to would-be union members only to renege during hard times.
However, not all cooperatives were failures. Many nonagricultral
and even agricultural cooperativesattained somemeasureof success.
Montemayor (1983) conduc_teda case study on the Davao del
Norte Free Farmers'Cooperative , Inc., which issituated in _asmall
town in Tubod, Davao del Nofte. The study attributed the success
of the DFFCl cash bond program to the following: timely credit
accessibility, implemcntors' credibility, effective repayment scheme,
provision of allied services, 'staff support, and continuous member-
ship education and organization. From a limited participation of
only 18 depositorsand 20 borrowers in 1980, the program grew to
accommodate 148 members and 103 borrowers in 1982. Loans
increasedsignificantly from only t=8,000 in 1980 to a high?=224,000
in 1982 with a respectablerepayment rate of 95.0 percent during
the three-year period. The DFFCI cash bond program, while only
about three years old, promisedto be a reliablesourceof credit in
the countryside. The. program could have become a showcaseofTAN : COOPERATIVE SYSTEM 347
farmer-contrived lending and of a savingsscheme had the DFFCI
been able to Competewith private traders on the purchaseof mem-
bers' produce. Lack of marketing facilities and services hinderedthe
cooperativein its marketing operations.
2. Summary of Recommendations
1. One of the major lessonswhich canbe learned from the failures
of SNs and other cooperative is that, in areaswhere there is
little economic activity, cooperativesengaged in trade are not
likely to succeeddue to the smallnessof the economic base.
Thus, before embarking on a cooperativedevelopmentscheme,
an assessment of the influence area,as well asof the feasibility
of the businessproposed to be established, should first be
made. Another lessonis the lack of preparationof cooperative
members to assumeresponsibility. Lack of disciplineand train-
ing has also hampered their operation. Thus, an honest-to-
goodness discipline-oriented program should be faithfully
undertaken before evenforming a cooperative.
2. Suggestions for the AMCs and CRBs are: minimization of red
tape in program implementation and aid to cooperatives;reduc-
tion in the extension of credit to membersand regularauditing
of the accounts;lessgovernment control on the internal affairs
of the cooperative; continuous education on the part of the
members as well as personnel of the cooperative; continuous
financial and technical aid; and government action on erring
officials and the creation of the Ministry of Cooperatives.
3. Villamin (1982) believes that the cooperatives will generate
capital from the government sector for its implementation.
He noted that funds for cooperativesare accumulating in bank
accountsand havereachedsubstantialproportions.
4. Another recommendation is the integration of the nonagricul-
tural cooperativesin the governmentlendingschemefor coope-
ratives.
It would seem that, on the basisof longer-term market poten-
tial, there are a number of other cooperatives classified as non-
agricultural which arein needof financial assistance. Thesealsoserve
farmers, fishermen and agri-business projects, have a sounderfinan-
cial condition, andare in a more advancedstageof developmentthan348 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
are agriculturalcooperativesto whichthe CMP isdirected.
C. Studieson Other Rural-BasedOrganizations
1. Focus or Credit and Credit-Reloted Aspects
Some rural-basedorganizationsare farming well while others
could not perform creditably.
The United States Agency for International Development
(1983) and the Bicol River BasinDevelopment Project did an
extensiveevaluation of three irrigation projectswithin the Bicol
River BasinDevelopment Project influence area. These are the
•Libmanan-Cabusao, Bula-Minalabac and Rinconada-Buhi/Lalo
irrigation projects.
The study was on (1) the capability of the various farmer
• groups to eventually, take over the management of the water
systems, (2) the viability of farmer organi_cations, and (3) bot-
tom.up participatory planning and credit use.The three irri-
gation projects started at different times - the Libmanan-
Cabusaoin. 1975, the Bula-Minalabacin 1978, and the Rinco-
nada-Buhi/Lalo in 1979. Despite an early lead, the Libmanan.
Cabusao is trailing behind the other two in many respects.
The Libmanan-Cabusaoproject also has the highest•costover-
run from the originally approved costing confirmation. The
estimate is that it will in•cura cost overrun of 84.97 percent
when finally completed. Bula-Minalabac's overrun will be at a
lower 65.28 percent while Rinconada.Buhi/Lalo's would be
negligibleat 12.15 percent.
The major objective of the three projects was to increase
production and the income of farmers through efficient deli-
very of water, improved crop•production techniquesand timely
application of inputs and credit and the.sufficient availability
of extension services and marketing facilities. Some positive
and negative impacts have been noted due to the projects in-
cluding: (a) increasedcollection rates for both property and
businesstaxes in the, municipalities affected by the projects.
The records•showthat these increasescoincided with the in-
troduction of the irrigation, systems: (b) readily apparent
housing improvements in the areas. In addition, there was
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production, including a proliferation of ducks; (c) land values
appear to have increased, e.g., from an estimated preproject
value in Libmanan-Cabusaoof_=3,S00 per ha.to a current value
of t=12,000 per ha.; (d) increased,businessand employment
opportunities, both in terms of farm employment and sup-
porting services, with small private enterprises sprouting;
(e) greater variety and amounts of consumerdurablesand capi-
tal investment in storesand homes; (f) strengthenedtransport
structure with more vehicles and a much reduced transport
cost; (g) greater availability of water for bathing, drinking,
watering, livestock,and the like; and (h) improvedfish supplies
and lessproblems of flooding, drainage, soil erosionand salini-
zation.
The farmer-group badly needed more credit support to further
diversify farm activities.The evaluation also noted that the farmers'
incomesoutside the project areasdeclined in real termsvis-a_-vis the
consumer price index. While the evaluation did not mention the real
incomesvis._-visthe consumer price index insidethe project areas,it
may be assumedthat the problem wasalsotrue insidetheseproject
areas although to a lesserdegree.This setback showsthat the price
system did not improve the farmers' incomesfrom rice production.
It should be noted that, due to the project, some private enter-
prisessprouted. Given the right planning and management,the proj-
ect site may yet become a showcasefor successfulintegrated area-
specific financing and development. Casesof conflicts among bene-
ficiaries and lack of discipline and leadershipare well highlighted
in a casestudy conducted by Plana (1983). Sheobservedthat the
low irrigation fee collection in the Walang Tanggihan Integrated
Service Association Service area was due to the poor discipline
among farmers. The problem of poor cooperation and lack of
discipline by farmers was aggravatedby the lack of strong leader-
ship and inadequate NIA supervision.Becauseof this, the tractor
for communal use that was being amortized was foreclosed by
the bank since it could not be paid due to low fund levelsgenera-
ted by the group. Many were not willing to pay due to conflicts in
interestrate in the useof irrigation.
Experiencesof the Philippine Businessfor Social Progress(PBSP)
financing rural-basedgroupsare worth mentioning (PazCruz, Valera
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assistanceto more than 25 agribusiness projects, one of which is the
group made up of 44 farmer-members of the Bisig ng Magsasakain
BiEan, Laguna. In addition to a financial advance of P87,000, the
PBSP would initially manage the project. The project involves the
organization and operation of a "Farm Service Center" to be man-
aged by the farmers themselves. The center envisions to promote
improved farm practices, input and output marketing, and incresed
agribusiness knowledge. After one and a half years of operations,
the average family income of farm-households increased from
P5,289 to _7,764.00 per year and savings increased from P24.30
to P_6"/.07per month.
Another project worth noting is the Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur small
fishermen development project, which was successfully implemented
in 1973 with the construction and sale of 2.4 fishing boats to 24
fishermen through a P20,O00 PBSP financial assistance.This loan
was completely repaid in April 1978. Also in the area of fishing,
eighteen fishermen in General Santos City, South Cotabato, got some
P_31,200 from the PBSP for the purchase of six fishing boat_ plus
P20,O00 in grant for educational program purposes. Fishing opera-
tions commenced in October 19"/4. From September 1975 to Feb-
ruary 1976, fishing boat operations improved, resulting in a 51.3
percent increase in gross production and a 23.0 percent increase in
sales compared to 1974. The following year, however, saw a steep
drop in production due to bad weather piracy. Fishermen were
constrained to amortize the boats which they bought. In the mean-
time, they launched a massive capital buildup campaign by deduct-
ing 5 percent of the net sales of fishermen through the fixed and
savings deposits made by the fishermen with the associations until
they can pay off their amortization.
Other informal farm-based groups are the compact farms which
are the handiwork of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).
Studies show that the compact farm program suffers from several
weaknessesand constraints (TBAC 1981). The volume of operations
is not large enough to enable farm management to generate econ-
omies of scale for the members' benefit. Diversification through
forward and backward linkages is not feasible due to limited
resources. Production yield, however, has improved considerably,
ranging from 74 cavans/ha, to 113 cavans/ha. This is due primarily
to efficient farm management, provision of extension services by
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this, nonetheless,farmers at times suffer low returns due to rising
input prices, inadequate postharvest facilities, low output prices,
andsometimesevenlack of markets.
Castillo (1978) also studied compact farms, and observed
that there was evidence of group participation among compact
farm members when it came time to obtain loans. The most fie-
quently mentioned reasons for joining the compact farm were:
availability of low interest loans and farm supplies, the desire to
increaseproduction, the chanceto learn modern methodsof farming,
and the availability of technical assistance.Decisionof members to
stay on dependedon the continuing availability of theseadvantages
of credit, efficient farm management, technicalassistanceand desire
to increaseproduction. Another reasoncited was the pleasant com-
pany of other members. Disagreementamong members,inefficient
management and compulsion to pay loans and buy unnecessary
inputs were some reasonsfor quitting.
For seldaswhich are loosely-organizedsmall farmer groups, Mon-
temayor comparatively studied five compact farms in Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan and Iloilo and five seldasin Infanta, Quezon. In his study,
most farmer-members in compact farms experienced decreases
rather than increasesin harvestsdue to high costsof production
and natural calamities. Farmers belonging to the seldas increased
their net incomelevelsunlike before,suggesting that inadequateprice
support negatively affected compact farm operations and that the
selda'sproduction levelsmay haveoffset increases in farm inputs.
2. Summary of Recommendations
With respect to other rural-basedgroups, the following are sug-
gested: (a) project implementation should includethe project bene-
ficiaries even during the project planning stage, implying that the
beneficiaries themselvesshould be aware of what the project hopes
to achieve. Discipline and identification of a strong leader to be
chosen by the farmers themselvesshould be instilled; (b) follow-up
of the project, educational and skills training and the provisionof
technical and credit assistance could play a major role in the project,
as in the experienceof the PBSP;(c) credit alone is not "the" main
factor in project development. Production may increaseand man-
agement capability may have improved but the members' soci_
economic statusmay remain the sameor deteriorate due to the proj-352 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ect. Pricing and marketing support and their importation, again,
cannot be overemphasized.The compact farm experience should be
an eye-opener; (d) a savingscampaignshould be an integral part of
the project especially in caseswhere credit is not forthcoming, as
in the case of the PBSP-funded fishing boat project in Davao del
Sur.
III. CONCLUSION
Evidences suggestthat cooperatives and other rural-basedorgani-
zations can still becomea potent set of small producer associations
capable of developing income-generatingactivities for the benefit
of their members, provided they get assistanceand benefit from
an appropriatepolicy mix.
The newdispensationhascontinued to show concern for the devel-
opment of rural-based cooperatives and farmers' organizations.
This is underscored in the country's national development plan
(1987-1992) where the cooperatives will remain to play a major
role in the advancementof their members' interests.
Government policies to promote cooperatives have proven to
be viable. As a result, various cooperative development programs,
notably the Cooperative Development Loan Fund (CDLF), were a
suspendeddue to low repayment rate on loans and to insufficient
viability of the cooperatives' economic activities. One factor that
stands out after a review and analysis of cooperatives' failures is
the need for extensive training among cooperative members on the
nuanceson how to get a cooperative systemgoing.Thus_the govern-
ment thrust in this regardisto make certain suchtraining needsare
met.
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